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The Landlord’s Duty and Unsafe Premises 
It is well established that a landlord owes a tenant a duty of care to “take reasonable care to avoid 
foreseeable risk of injury to their prospective tenants and members of their household”.1  What 
often arises is the question of how far the scope of that duty extends.  
 In Sheehy v Hobbs [2012] QSC 333 the plaintiff was injured when she fell down a flight of internal 
stairs of the townhouse she leased from the defendants.  The plaintiff claimed damages for a breach 
of duty owed to her in negligence, and also alleged breaches of the duties owed to her pursuant to s 
103 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1994 (Qld) and her tenancy agreement. 
Negligence  
The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were in breach of their duty of care as landlords for failing 
to provide adequate warning of the dangers of descending the stairs when they ought to have 
known of the stairs unsafe condition.  The plaintiff fell as she went to go down the internal stairs.  As 
her foot slipped on the top stair she tried to recover her balance but fell down the six stairs to the 
landing. 
It was claimed that the stairs were steep, insufficiently lit, lacked handrails and were in an unsafe 
condition as they had not been repaired. However, there was no reported injury being sustained on 
the stairs during the plaintiff’s lease or evidence of previous complaints as to the condition of the 
stairs. 
The evidence presented to the court was that the safety of the stairs could have been made safer 
and that ‘the stairs presented an increased risk of slipping and falling than they would have’ if 
certain features were improved (at [58]). At [63] McMeekin J stated: 
Steps that could have been taken that would have substantially lessened the risk of a fall 
included the provision of an appropriate handrail, the provision of some form of improved 
nosing on the stairs by the installation of a non skid strip, and improvement of lighting. 
These were all simple measures and inexpensive. 
However, the issue was ‘whether the law required the landlord to take these steps’ (at [64]) which 
required a consideration of the landlord’s scope of duty.  The members of the High Court in Jones v 
Bartlett (2000) 205 CLR 166 expressed the duty of a landlord in various ways, but with the common 
theme that a landlord was expected to take reasonable care to avoid foreseeable risks of injury to 
tenants and their household.2  After reviewing the variety of ways in which scope of the duty was 
expressed in Jones v Bartlett, McMeekin J identified at [85] that ‘the key obligation there discussed is 
to take “reasonable steps to ascertain the existence of any such defects” and no judge in the 
plurality put the duty any higher’. 
The evidence was that the stairs substantially complied with the minimum requirements of the 
Building Code of Australia 1990.  The plaintiff argued that the complex in which the leased unit was 
situated was similar to a commercial enterprise as it had 56 units with a significant turnover of 
tenants and therefore ‘a more exacting standard' than provided by the Building Code was 
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appropriate (at [86]).  McMeekin J disagreed, noting that such an argument would link a landlord’s 
duty to the success of other units in the complex being leased and that the higher standard imposed 
upon commercial premises was due to greater numbers of people going onto the premises and the 
occupier’s inability to exert sufficient control requires that visitors be given assistance as there is a 
‘greater foreseeable risk of injury and so greater demands placed on the occupier’ (at [89]). 
But more importantly, the plaintiff’s submission was that the scope of the duty should be more than 
that imposed by the Building Code of Australia.  McMeekin J stated at [91]: 
But fatally the submission runs directly counter to the decision in [Gration v C Gillan 
Investments Pty Ltd [2005] 2 Qd R 267] and most clearly expressed in Jones by Gummow and 
Hayne JJ that “the Court should be slow to hold that the content of a common law duty rises 
above that which has been imposed by statute in various Australian jurisdictions” ((2000) 
205 CLR 166, [172]; Callinan J was plainly of the same view: see [289]-[290]). Plainly the 
statutory duty is to comply with the applicable Building Code, that being the relevant “law 
dealing with issues about the health or safety of persons using or entering the premises” 
referred to in the statute. The Building Code required that the landlord meet the class 1 
building requirements, not some other, more demanding, class. 
Although McMeekin J thought that the stairs were defective as defined by Gummow and Haynes JJ 
in Jones v Bartlett3 that was not sufficient to impose liability.  The duty of a landlord is to take 
reasonable steps to ‘discover and deal with the risk of injury in question’ (at [94]).  The evidence 
before the court was that the defendants did not know of the defect in the stairs nor was the defect 
obvious to a lay person.  In order for the defect to be discovered, it would have been necessary for 
the defendants to have employed an expert and such action was not reasonable in the 
circumstances.  His Honour reasoned at [97] that ‘the engagement of experts without notice of some 
particular problem is not usually done’.  It was concluded at [104] that ‘[i]n the absence of any 
evidence of actual or constructive notice of a “defect” there can be no breach of duty, whether 
contractual, statutory or at common law’. 
Contract and Statute 
Section 103(2) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1990 (Qld) requires that a landlord must ensure that 
the leased premises are fit for the tenant to live in, are in good repair and ‘ensure any law dealing 
with issues about the health or safety of persons using or entering the premises is complied with’.  
Clause 25 of the General Tenancy Agreement, which the plaintiff was a party to, replicates s 103 of 
the Act.  In Gration v C Gillan Investments Pty Ltd [2005] 2 Qd R 267 it was held that these 
contractual and statutory provisions do not amount to warranties but require the landlord to take 
reasonable steps to determine and satisfy themselves that the leased premises are safe. 
McMeekin J held that there was no breach of the lease or Act by the defendants.  There was no 
evidence that the stairs were not in good repair nor that the defendants were in breach of any law 
related to the health or safety.  The fact that the tread of the stairs upon which the plaintiff slipped 
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was slightly less than required by the Building Code did not amount to a breach of the lease 
agreement nor the Act.  At [75] McMeekin J sensibly noted: 
It was not suggested that the defendants were aware of the minimal difference in the goings 
of the stairs as carpeted, or that a reasonable landlord should have been. The difference 
here was a few millimetres. The only way that the deficit could have been discovered was to 
take a ruler and measure the goings on each step and then compare that measurement to 
the requirements of the Code. I cannot conceive that a failure by a landlord to undertake 
such actions between tenancies is unreasonable. There was certainly no evidence that 
landlords typically did any such thing.  
Conclusion 
In Jones v Bartlett, the High Court held that a landlord was not required to replace items that may 
pose a foreseeable risk of injury merely because safer items were available.4 Sheehy v Hobbs follows 
this decision and emphasises the need to assess what is reasonable, without the benefit of hindsight.   
If a plaintiff claims that the leased premises could have been safer and if they were, they would not 
have been injured, then the plaintiff faces certain hurdles.  It must be proven that the premises were 
in fact not safe and that the landlord knew this or ought to have known this.  Further, it must be 
established that in all of the circumstances, it was unreasonable for the landlord not to have taken 
the measures to make the premises safer.   
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